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THE JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF THE CAUSATION
TEST OF THE FALSE STATEMENT DOCTRINE
IN SECURITIES LITIGATION IN CHINA
Ling Dai†
Abstract: As part of the reform of China’s centrally planned economy, one of the
primary purposes in establishing a stock market was to help state-owned enterprises raise
sufficient capital from the public. The protection of investors’ interests was not essential
in the initial contemplation of securities laws, though the listed companies have a duty of
disclosure under the 1998 Securities Law. After the Supreme People’s Court
promulgated its judicial interpretation of the false statement doctrine in civil securities
cases in 2002, the lower courts started to interpret and apply the elements of the false
statement doctrine in securities cases brought by public investors to seek civil
compensation against the listed companies that misrepresented or omitted major
information. The causation test of the false statement doctrine is the determinative issue
in many false statement cases. This Comment explores the confusion in the causation
test under the Supreme People’s Court’s judicial interpretation of the false statement
doctrine, evaluates the application of the causation test in two civil securities cases, and
argues that a trial court should interpret the causation test in favor of public investors in a
close case in light of the legislative intent to protect public investors and the practical
need to reconstruct investors’ confidence in the stock market in China.

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2001, more than eighty listed companies in China’s stock market
were investigated and penalized by the China’s Securities Regulatory
Commission (“CSRC”) for fraud, misrepresentation, or non-disclosure of
material corporate information.1 The stock market in China underwent an
unprecedented trust crisis,2 and numerous investors who had suffered losses
started to question the existing model of the stock market.3 In August 2004,
the Jinan Intermediate People’s Court (the trial court) of Shandong Province
issued its decision in Zhang He v. Bohai Group.4 This case brought about
†
The author would like to thank Professor Dongsheng Zang for his guidance and assistance through
the process of writing this comment.
1
Re dian tou shi [Hot Topics], ZHONGGUO ZHENGQUAN BAO [CHINA SEC. DAILY], Jan. 4, 2002,
available at http://www.cs.com.cn/csnews/20020104/175563.asp.
2
Id. See also Shi Guohua, Shichang Zaoyu Nanyi Chengshou de Xinren Zhitong [The Market
Underwent Unbelievable Pain due to Trust Crisis], RENMIN WANG [PEOPLE’S NETWORK], available at
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/jingji/1041/1042/2773135.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2006).
3
Re dian tou shi, supra note 1.
4
Zhang He su Yinzuo Bohai Yituan [Zhang He v. Bohai Group] (Jinan Interm. People’s Ct., Aug. 4,
2004) (hereinafter Bohai Group). Different from U.S. courts, Chinese courts publicize a very small number
of cases. This case has not been publicized by the court. All the discussions of the case in this comment
are based on the information collected from websites, Bohai Group’s official corporate documents, and the
CSRC documents. See Ba yue fa zhi jiao dian hui gu [August Legal Focuses], RENMIN WANG [PEOPLE’S
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the first open trial in China involving a public investor seeking damages
against a listed company under the false statement doctrine.5 In the same
month, the Ha’erbin Intermediate People’s Court made a judgment in Chen
Lihua v. Daqing Lianyi Corporation on the same grounds.6 These two cases
are representative of earlier judicial application of the false statement
doctrine in civil securities litigation in China.
Despite its short history, the stock market in China has experienced
considerable ups and downs since its establishment in the early 1990s. By
the end of 2005, the number of listed companies in the securities market had
increased from fewer than twenty to 1,381.7 The total value of the stocks
trading in the open market reached RMB 3.24 trillion (US$405 billion) in
2005.8 However, in spite of its early rapid development, there has been a
downturn in the stock market since 2000. For example, the Composite Index
of Shanghai Stock Exchange has declined from over 2,073 at the end of
2000 to 1,161 in 2005.9 The majority of public investors have suffered
serious loss in recent years, including most institutional investors.10
The large scale misconduct of listed companies played a significant
role in the downturn of the stock market. The listed companies’ constant
false disclosures or major omissions of material information garnered broad
attention, both within the stock market and among society generally. For
example, cases of listed companies making false statements occurred every
month in 2001.11 Pervasive misconduct as well as the poor performance of
many listed companies exhausted investors’ trust and confidence in the
market.12 Many scholars have pointed out that the securities market cannot
NETWORK], Oct. 12, 2004, available at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shehui/8217/29997/30337/
2914061.html.
5
Ba yue fa zhi jiao dian hui gu, supra note 4.
6
Chen Lihua su Daqing Lianyi Gongsi [Chen Lihua v. Daqing Lianyi Corporation] (Higher
People’s Court of Heilongjiang, Dec. 21, 2004), ISINOLAW (last visited Apr. 18, 2006) (hereinafter Daqing
Lianyi); see Xin Wei, Da qing lian yi xu jia chen shu bei qi shu [Daqing LianYi was Sued for False
Statement], SHANGHAI FAZHI BAO [SHANGHAI LEGAL RULING NEWS], available at
http://shszx.eastday.com/epublish/gb/paper4/12/class000400005/hwz639842.htm (last visited Apr. 14,
2006).
7
CSRC Statistical Information, Summary by Shares Categories, available at http://www.csrc.
com.cn/en/statinfo/index_en.jsp?path=ROOT>EN>Statistical%20Information (last visited Apr. 14, 2006).
8
Id. (Major Index).
9
Shanghai Stock Exchange, Data of Composite Index of Shanghai Stock Exchange from 1989 to
2006, available at http://www.sse.com.cn/sseportal/ps/zhs/ggxx/zsjbxx.jsp?indexName=&indexCode=
000001 (last visited Apr. 14, 2006).
10
See Shi Guohua, supra note 2.
11
Jian Fu, Information Disclosure and Corporate Governance in Listed Companies in China: From
Yinguangxia to Enron, AUSTRALIAN J. CORP. L., available at 2004 AJCL LEXIS 13, 10.
12
Xu Binglan, Securities Legislation Protects Investors, CHINA DAILY, Feb. 28, 2005, available at
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-02/28/content_419958.htm.
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be revitalized without an effective mechanism to monitor and prevent such
misconduct.13
A system of civil compensation through judicial processes is often
regarded as the most popular candidate for such a mechanism. Under
current law, although a listed company that conducted fraud or made false
statements might be fined by administrative agencies,14 or the directors of
the company may be punished by criminal statutes,15 public investors who
have suffered serious financial losses due to the companies’ fraud or other
misconduct do not have legal remedies. Public investors need greater
protection, and the current legal system is woefully insufficient. To address
the inadequacies of the system, in 2003, the Supreme People’s Court of
China (“SPC”)16 issued its judicial interpretation under the title of “Some
Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Trying Cases of Civil
Compensation Arising from False Statement in Securities Market” (“SPC
Provisions”).17 For the first time, a SPC judicial interpretation provided
substance and procedures for aggrieved public investors seeking civil
damages against a listed company that made false statements.
The causation test in the SPC Provisions soon became the dispositive
issue of the false statement doctrine after the SPC’s promulgation of the SPC
Provisions. The relationship between cause and effect can be very
complicated in civil securities litigation.18 One cause might result in
multiple effects while one effect may result from multiple causes.19 In a
stock transaction, it is often very hard for a plaintiff investor to prove that
13

See, e.g., Chen Sheng, Min shi ze ren zhi du yu zheng quan fa zong zhi de shi xian [The
Realization of Civil Liability System and Goals of Securities Laws], RENMIN FAYUAN BAO [NEWSPAPER OF
PEOPLE’S COURT], Dec. 12, 2001.
14
See Shi Xiaobo, Zhong guo zheng quan shi chang xu jia chen shu min shi ze ren gou cheng yao
jian yan jiu [A Study of the Composing Elements of Civil Liability for False Statements in China’s
Securities Market], 142 ZHONGNAN CAIJING ZHENGFA DAXUE XUEBAO [J. ZHONGNAN U. ECON. & L.] 105,
105-106 (2004); see also Yu Guanghua, Rang wei fa zhe you su song wei ji gan [Litigation Threat to
Violators], ZHONGGUO ZHENGQUAN BAO [CHINA SEC. DAILY], Sep. 26, 2002, available at
http://www.cs.com.cn/csnews/20020926/282439.asp.
15
See Shi Xiaobo, supra note 14, Yu Guangua, supra note 14.
16
The highest court in China [hereinafter SPC].
17
Guan yu shen li zheng quan shi chang yin xu jia chen shu yin fa de min shi pei chang an jian de
ruo gan gui ding [Some Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Trying Cases of Civil Compensation
Arising from False Statement in Securities Market] (promulgated on Dec. 26, 2002, effective on Feb. 1,
2003) [hereinafter SPC Provisions] LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Apr. 14, 2006).
18
Liu Junhai, Lun zheng quan shi chang fa lv ze ren de li fa he si fa xie tiao [Legislative and Judicial
Conciliation of Legal Liability of the Securities Market], 25 XIANDAI FAXUE [MODERN LAW SCIENCE] 3,
10 (2003); see also Chen Jie, Lun zheng quan min shi pei chang zhong yin guo guan xi de tui ding [Finding
the Causal Relationship in Securities Cases for Civil Compensation], ZHONGGUO FAXUE WANG [NAT’L
INSTITUTE OF LAW], available at http://www.iolaw.org.cn/showarticle.asp?id=1365 (last visited Apr. 14,
2006).
19
Id.
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the alleged false statement is the sole or significant cause of the investor’s
loss.20 Many plaintiffs have lost their cases merely because they failed to
sufficiently demonstrate that the company’s false statement was in fact the
sole cause of their losses in the stock transaction.21 A trial court’s
interpretation and application of the causation test under the SPC Provisions
has become determinative in deciding the false disclosure dispute between a
public investor and a listed company.22
This Comment argues that a trial court should broadly interpret the
causation test of the false statement doctrine to protect the interests of public
investors in cases where public investors seek monetary damages against the
listed company for its false statements. Part II describes the establishment of
the false statement doctrine and the causation test through market practice
and the development of the legal system. Part III analyzes the confusion of
the causation test in the SPC Provisions and tries to demonstrate the possible
readings a trial court may have when applying it to cases. Part IV analyzes
the application of the causation test in Zhang He v. Bohai Group and Chen
Lihua v. Daqing Lianyi Corporation. Finally, Part V explains why the trial
court should adopt a broad approach in applying the causation test in civil
securities cases.
II.

THE CAUSATION TEST OF THE FALSE STATEMENT DOCTRINE WAS
FORMALLY ESTABLISHED THROUGH THE PROMULGATION OF THE SPC
PROVISIONS

The false statement doctrine in China’s securities laws has its roots in
general civil liability cases in tort and contract. Under the General
Principles of the Civil Law, a party that acquired property as a result of fraud
should compensate the other party for losses that are caused by the fraud.23
However, the concept of this doctrine of fraud was not fully developed in
private securities litigation when the Securities Law was first promulgated in

20

Id.; see also Shao Zongwei, Judicial Interpretation to Curb Fraud in Stock Trading, CHINA
DAILY, Oct. 7, 2002, at 1.
21
See Li Minghui & Xie Jun, Lun xu jia chen shu min shi su song zhong yin guo guan xi de ren ding
[The Determination of the Causation in Civil Litigation for False Statements], 9 GUOJI MAOYI WENTI
[INTERNATIONAL TRADE PROBLEMS] 60 (2003).
22
See Yin Shaoping, Xu jia chen shu pei chang an zhong yin guo guan xi de pan duan [The
Determination of Causation in Civil Damage Cases Under the False Statement Doctrine], ZHONGGUO
ZHENGQUAN BAO [CHINA SEC. DAILY], Sept. 10, 2004, available at http://www.cs.com.cn/
csnews/10/01/15/200409100243.htm.
23
See MIN FA TONG ZE (P.R.C.) [GENERAL CIVIL PRINCIPLES OF THE CIVIL LAW OF THE P.R.C.],
Chairman’s Order 1986 No. 37, available at http://en.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=2696 (last visited
Apr. 12, 2006) (Articles 58(3) and 61 are related to civil liability for fraud).
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1994. Instead, the doctrine developed to fulfill the needs of the stock market
and legal practice.
The false statement doctrine in securities laws is a special category of
the doctrine of fraud applied in general civil compensation cases. In the
context of securities laws, the false statement doctrine under the SPC
Provisions allows a public investor to seek civil damage against a listed
company,24 where (1) the listed company has made a false statement
consisting of either untruthful information or omission of material
information, (2) the public investor has suffered loss in his stock
transactions, and (3) the listed company’s false statement has caused the
public investor’s loss.25 Thus, the false statement doctrine can be
summarized by three elements: the false statement, actual losses, and the
causation test. A public investor who brings a lawsuit against a listed
company under the false statement doctrine will receive monetary
compensation based on his actual financial loss if he can prove all three
elements at trial.
In most cases, the falsehood in the company’s public documents and
the investor’s loss can be easily found because of the broad definition of
false statement under the SPC Provision.26 A false statement can be any
untruthful disclosure or major omission of material information.27 The
investor’s loss can be found through the records of transaction prices.
However, the causal relationship between the false statement and the
investor’s loss remains difficult to discern even after SPC issued its judicial
interpretation of the doctrine and the test.28
A.

The Protection of Public Investors from Listed Companies’ False
Statements Was Not Contemplated During the Establishment of the
Stock Market

The modern stock market in China is still very new, but it has
developed rapidly.29 The Chinese government established the Shanghai
Stock Exchange in 1990 and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 1991,30 which
24
This Comment only discusses listed companies who have made false statements. Under the SPC
Provisions, defendants can include intermediate agencies in the stock market such as law firms, accounting
firms and brokerage firms.
25
Li Minghui & Xie Jun, supra note 21, at 60.
26
See SPC Provisions, supra note 17, art. 17.
27
Id.
28
Shao Zongwei, supra note 20; Li Minghui & Xie Jun, supra note 21, at 60.
29
See Hui Huang, China’s Takeover Law: A Comparative Analysis and Proposals for Reform, 30
DEL. J. CORP. L. 145, 148-49 (2005).
30
Id. at 148.
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became the national stock exchanges in China.31 Individual investors
compose the majority of trading accounts in China’s stock market.32 There
are over 72 million securities trading accounts in China today.33 A little
more than half of the individual investors have an annual income below
RMB 20,000 (US$2,418).34 Many individual investors do not have the
necessary financial or investment knowledge of securities to conduct trading
in the stock market.35
One of the primary motives of the Chinese government in establishing
a stock market was to further the reform of state-owned enterprises.36 Since
the mid-1980s, the Chinese government started to delegate some power to
state-owned enterprises through contracting between the government and the
enterprises.37 However, the management of the contracting enterprises
lacked long-term objectives under the contracting system because all of the
appointed managers were “officials affiliated with government agencies and
had no incentive to improve the enterprises’ performance.”38
The
shareholding system in enterprises was proposed and established to “provide
a means of raising capital, management means, and motivation
mechanisms.”39
Since the establishment of the stock market, the
government has emphasized the interests of state-owned enterprises and
their revenue-producing capability.40 Though the government tried to realize
the role of the enterprises in light of their independent management, the
government did not contemplate the potential liability that such an
independent enterprise might have to assume with regard to its public
investors.41

31

Jian Fu, supra note 11, at 4.
Jiong Deng, Building an Investor-friendly Shareholder Derivative Lawsuit System in China, 46
HARV. INT’L L.J. 347, 347-48.
33
Id at 347-48.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Hong Jun, Zheng quan shi chang xu jia chen shu ji qi min shi pei chang ze ren [False Statements
in Securities Market and Civil Liability], LIAONING JINGJI [LIAONING ECONOMY], Sept. 2003, at 76, 76-77.
37
Xuefeng Qian, Riding Two Horses: Corporatizing Enterprises and the Emerging Securities
Regulatory Regime in China, 12 UCLA PAC. BASIN L. J. 62, 74 (1993).
38
Id. at 74-75.
39
Id. at 76.
40
Hong Jun, supra note 36, at 76.
41
See id.
32
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The Initial Development of Securities Laws Nurtured the False
Statement Doctrine but Failed to Provide a Sufficient Private Cause of
Action

The uniform national regulations of the stock market in China started
with the Interim Regulation on the Issue and Trading of Shares (“IRITS”) on
April 22, 1993.42 Before the promulgation of national regulations, both
Shanghai and Shenzhen municipal governments enacted administrative
measures to regulate the stock transactions in their regions.43 In 1992, the
State Council Securities Committee (“SCSC”) and the CSRC were created
to form “a nationwide regulatory policy” as a response to the existence of
national stock markets in Shanghai and Shenzhen.44 Together, the SCSC and
the CSRC promulgated the IRITS.45
The IRITS narrowly defines the liability of the corporations,
promoters, and intermediaries for violating the duty of disclosure. The
IRITS requires that the listed companies correctly reveal material corporate
information.46 However, its explicit regulation on falsification is limited to
only the information disclosed in the initial public offering of stocks
(“IPO”).47 Moreover, violators for misinformation are only subject to
administrative penalties.48 The IRITS does not hold the violators liable to
public investors.
The first Securities Law49 in China defined the company’s liability but
failed to provide a sufficient legal mechanism under which a public investor
could seek private remedies. Although the Statute provided that a company
should be liable to its investors for their losses in the course of securities
trading that resulted from the company’s misinformation, it did not provide
an explicit cause of action to public investors.50 Moreover, fines remitted by
42

Gu piao fa xing yu guan li zan xing tiao li [The Interim Regulation on the Issue and Trading of
Shares] [hereinafter IRITS], State Council’s Order 1993 No. 112, available at
http://www.cnlawservice.com/chinese/law&regulation/flcx/b62.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2006).
43
Benjamin R. Tarbutton, China—A National Regulatory Framework for the PRC’s Stock Markets
Begins to Emerge, 24 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 411, 415-16 (1994).
44
Id. at 420.
45
Id.
46
IRITS, supra note 42, ch. 6.
47
Id. art. 17, 21, 73.
48
Id. art. 74.
49
Zheng quan fa (P.R.C.) [Securities Law of P.R.C], Chairman’s Order 1998 No. 12,
CHINALAWINFO (last visited Apr. 14, 2006) (hereinafter Securities Law). The latest Securities Law of
People’s Republic of China was issued in 2005. Because the false statement doctrine in the SPC Provisions
was established in accordance with the securities laws before 2003, any discussion of securities laws in this
Comment is limited to those before 2003.
50
Id. art. 63; see also id. art. 24, 59, 63, 72, 177, 181, 188, 189, 202 (governing information
disclosure of listed companies and other violators).

740

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 15 NO. 3

the company would go to the government instead of to the injured private
party.51 Before the issuance of the SPC Provisions in 2003, when a public
investor brought a lawsuit against a listed company under then-existing
securities laws, most courts simply declared that they did not have
jurisdiction over these cases because the Securities Law was silent about
whether a public investor may file a lawsuit against the listed company for
its false statement.52
C.

The SPC Issued Its Circular to Complement the Legal Insufficiency of
the Securities Law on Civil Liabilities for Falsehood of Information

The stock market in China experienced a downturn since 2000 despite
its rapid development in earlier years.53 The Composite index of the
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges continuously declined until
2005.54 The majority of public investors suffered serious loss as a result.55
Numerous cases of fraudulent information disclosed by listed
companies diminished the public investors’ incentive to invest and
significantly contributed to the downturn of the stock market.56 Misconduct
of the listed companies, particularly in the form of false disclosure, has
plagued the stock market in China since the early 1990s due to insufficient
legal remedies.57 Shenzhen Yuanye Industry Corporation became the first
company de-listed from the stock market in 1992 for its illegal conduct,
which included false statements regarding the source and amount of its
investment capital.58
On September 21, 2001, the SPC decided that the courts, for the time
being, would not hear any cases seeking civil damages for insider trading,
fraud, market manipulation, and other misconduct of listed companies and
intermediate stock agencies.59 This decision was a result of the absence of
civil liability provisions in the Securities Law. Courts were unable to protect
individual investors due to the absence of statutes governing false statements
51

Id. art. 177.
Liu Junhai, supra note 18, at 4.
53
See Shanghai Stock Exchange, supra note 9.
54
Id.
55
See Shi Guohua, supra note 2.
56
See Cui Yihong, Guan yu wo guo zhen quan min shi pei chang ze ren wen ti de fa lv si kao [A
Thought on Civil Liability in Securities Cases in China], 16 XI’AN CAIJING XUEYUAN XUEBAO [J. XI’AN
INST. FIN. & ECON.] 63, 63 (2003).
57
Jian Fu, supra note 11, at 9.
58
Id. at 10-11. Listed companies who have falsified material information include the Qingminyuan
Company in 1998, Sichuan Hongguang Company in 1998, Lantian Shareholding Compay and Yiguangxia
Company in 2001, and Daqing Lianyi Company in 2002. Id.
59
Sun Min & Li Jing, Corporate Fraud before the Courts, CHINA DAILY, Feb. 12, 2003, at 2.
52

SEPTEMBER 2006

SECURITIES LITIGATION IN CHINA

741

in securities cases and providing for civil compensation.60 Individual public
investors lost not only their money but also their trust in the stock market
because of the listed companies’ fraudulent conduct on such a large scale.61
The revitalization of the stock market must include a civil compensation
system to deter listed companies from making false statements, provide
remedies for investors’ losses resulting from companies’ violations of law,
and reconstruct investors’ trust and confidence in the stock market.
To address the legal insufficiency of the Securities Law in civil
litigation, the SPC issued a Circular in January 2002 establishing the
jurisdiction of courts over a dispute between public investors and listed
companies on false statements.62 This Circular explicitly provides that a
court must hear a civil securities case on the issue of a false statement when
a plaintiff files the lawsuit based on the CSRC’s confirmation of a
defendant’s violation.63 However, the Circular does not provide any
substantive or procedural rules to the application of false statement cases. It
does not define what constitutes a false statement, nor does it specify the
allocation of burden of proof.64 In practice after the Circular was issued,
though courts had jurisdiction over the cases to address the interests of
public investors, they had trouble determining the rules governing civil
securities cases.65

60
See Chen Sheng, supra note 13; Xin Zhiming, Bring Companies That Lie to Court, CHINA DAILY,
Jan. 21, 2002, at 4.
61
Xu Binglan, supra note 12.
62
Guan yu shou li zheng quan shi chang yi xu jia chen shu yin fa de min shi qing quan jiu feng an
jian you guan wen ti de tong zhi [Notice of the Supreme People’s Court on the Relevant Issues Concerning
the Acceptance of Civil Tort Dispute Cases Caused by False Statements in the Securities Markets]
(promulgated on Jan. 15, 2002) [hereinafter Circular], CHINALAWINFO (last visited Apr.14, 2006). The
SPC has authority to interpret the judicial application of laws and rules. Its judicial interpretation through
issuance of circular is a common practice in China. The SPC’s authority of judicial interpretation is partly
described in the Article 33 of the Organic Law of the People’s Courts (P.R.C.), available at
http://www.gov.cn/misc/2005-07/08/content_13200.htm.
63
Circular, supra note 62, art. 2.
64
Li Guoguang, Wo guo zheng quan shi chang si fa su song de shi jian wen ti yu qian jing [The
Practice, Challenges and Prospect of Securities Litigation in China], RENMIN FAYUAN BAO [NEWSPAPER
OF PEOPLE’S COURT], June 21, 2002. Li Guoguang is the Vice Chairman of the Supreme People’s Court in
China.
65
See Jia Wei, Shen li zheng quan shi chang xu jia chen shu min shi pei chang an jian de ji ge yi nan
wen ti [Several Difficult Questions Regarding Judicial Hearing of Civil Compensation Cases for False
Statements in Securities Market], RENMIN CIFA [PEOPLE’S JUDICARY] 9 (May, 2002).
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D.

The SPC Provisions Have Fully Established the False Statement
Doctrine in Civil Securities Litigation

The SPC Provisions help establish the legal foundation for the courts
to protect individual investors through civil compensation.66 They contain
eight chapters including general, substantive, and procedural provisions.67
The substantive provisions include Ascertainment on False Statement,
Causes for Liability Fixation and Exemption, and Ascertainment for
Losses.68 Procedural provisions include Entertainment of Cases and
Jurisdiction, Litigation Methods, and Liability for Joint Torts.69
The causation test of the false statement doctrine is described in
Articles 18, 19, and 20 of Chapter IV Ascertainment on False Statement.70
Article 18 defines the circumstances in which the causal relationship can be
established in false statement cases:71
(a) The investor’s transactions of the securities are directly
related to the false statement;
(b) The investor buys the securities on or after the date of false
statement, and before the exposure date or correction date;
(c) The investor suffers loss from selling the securities after the
exposure date or correction date or from continuously holding
the securities.
Under Article 18, the plaintiff investor has the initial burden of proving that
the company made false statements causing plaintiff’s losses.72 For a causal
relationship to exist, a public investor in lawsuits against the listed company
must show that a false statement made by the defendant company will
directly affect the transaction of securities.73 For example, a listed company
may report an increase in revenue, which in turn causes the stock price to
increase. Moreover, the causal relationship is structured in terms of
timing.74 Thus, the plaintiff must prove that he either bought or sold the

66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74

The SPC Provisions were approved in December 2002 and publicized on January 15, 2003.
See SPC Provisions, supra note 17.
Id.
Id.
See id. arts. 18, 19, 20.
Id. art. 18.
See id.
Id. art. 18(a)
Id. art. 18(b), (c).
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securities during a certain period of time to establish the causal
relationship.75
By contrast, Article 19 lists circumstances that exclude the existence
of the causal relationship:76
(a) The investor has sold the securities before the revelation
date or correction date;
(b) The investor conducts a transaction of the securities after the
revelation or correction date;
(c) The investor conducts a transaction despite his/her knowing
the existence of the false statement;
(d) The investor’s loss or part of the investor’s loss results from
the systematic risks of the securities market or due to reasons
other than the false statement;
(e) The investor invests maliciously.
Under Article 19, the defendant company bears the burden of proof.77 As
long as the defendant can prove one of the illustrated circumstances under
Article 19, the court will find no causal relationship between the plaintiff
investor’s loss and the defendant’s false statement. Article 19 generally
assumes that the effect of the false statement on the securities prices and
investors’ behavior no longer exists once the false statement is disclosed or
the investor has actual knowledge of the false statement.78
Article 20 provides definitions of three important dates in finding a
defendant’s liability:79
(a) The date of the false statement is the date when the false
statement is made or occurs;
(b) The revelation date is the date when the false statement is
initially exposed in national media including newspapers, radio
stations, and TV stations;
75

Id.
Id. art. 19.
77
Article 19 provides that “the defendant produces evidence” with respect to the listed
circumstances under this Provision.
78
Jia Wei, Zheng quan shi chang xu jia chen shu min shi an jian de pe ichang fan wei [The Scope of
Compensation in Civil False Statement Cases in Securities Market], RENMIN CIFA [PEOPLE’S JUDICARY],
Nov. 2002, at 9, 10.
79
SPC Provisions, supra note 17, art. 20.
76
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(c) The correction date is the date when the person who made
the false statement announces and corrects the false statement
on the media that are designated by the CSRC to disclose
securities market information and also suspends the trading of
the securities in accordance with provided procedures.
The definition provision is particularly important in finding the specific time
of disclosures, which ultimately determines causation. It is directly related
to Article 18’s provisions.
Through the SPC Provisions, the causation test of the false statement
doctrine is formally established in securities litigation where individual
investors may seek civil damages against listed companies that have violated
the disclosure requirement in the Securities Law. Articles 18 and 19 not
only provide circumstances for finding or excluding the causal relationship
but also allocate the proper burden of proof between the plaintiff investors
and the defendant companies.80 The plaintiff investor does not need to prove
the defendant’s actual knowledge of the false statement so long as the
evidence suffices to satisfy Article 18 requirements. On the other hand, the
defendant can rebut the claim by proving any circumstances provided under
Article 19 to deny the existence of causal relationship between the plaintiff’s
loss and the defendant’s false statement.
The formal establishment of the false statement doctrine is, to a large
extent, a response to the legal inadequacy of securities laws and trust crisis
in the stock market. Despite its origin in the general civil laws promulgated
in the 1980s, the application of the false statement doctrine in securities
litigation was not fully conceptualized in the initial development of
securities laws. The SPC formally established the doctrine through its
judicial interpretation in assuming the courts’ jurisdiction over securities
litigation brought by public investors seeking monetary damages. The
causation test contained in Articles 18, 19 and 20 of the SPC Provisions has
become the key issue in false statement cases.
III.

THE CAUSATION TEST IN THE SPC PROVISIONS IS CONFUSING AND
OPEN TO SEVERAL POSSIBLE INTERPRETATIONS

Despite the SPC’s efforts to provide an unambiguous and thorough
interpretation of the false statement doctrine, confusion exists not only in the
plain meaning of the provisions but also from the application of the
causation test in legal practice. The provisions related to the causation test
80

See id. arts. 18, 19.
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contain three major problems: the arguable relationship between Article
18(b) and 18(c), the loose definitions of the revelation date and correction
date under Article 20, and the uncertain scope and effect of systemic risks
under Article 19.
A.

Whether a Plaintiff Should Prove Both Article 18(b) and 18(c) or Only
One of Them to Meet the Causation Test Is Arguable

Article 18 is the key to understanding the causation test of the false
statement doctrine. Article 18 states that a court shall find that a listed
company’s false statement is the cause of a public investor’s loss if the
public investor can prove that he is under the illustrated circumstances of
Article 18(a), 18(b), and 18(c).81 Article 18(a) requires that the plaintiff
investor have traded the stock that is directly related to the defendant
company’s false statement.82 In most cases, the plaintiff has suffered losses
from buying and selling the stock issued by the defendant company. The
proof of a “direct relationship” under Article 18(a) rarely arises as an issue
before a court.
Article 18(b) and 18(c) lay down the other two possible
circumstances: (1) an investor buys the stock after the false statement date
and before the disclosure date83 and (2) an investor sells or holds the stock
after the revelation/correction date.84 In the original text of the SPC
Provisions, no connector exists between Article 18(b) and 18(c).85 If the
connector between Article 18(b) and 18(c) is “and,” only plaintiffs who buy
the stock before the disclosure date and sell or hold after the disclosure date
can sustain the burden to prove the causal relationship under the false
statement doctrine and therefore receive appropriate compensation for their
losses. If the connector is “or,” both plaintiffs who buy before the disclosure
date, and those who sell or hold afterwards, may receive their compensation.
The choice between “and” as opposed to “or” becomes important because it
determines how many investors may survive the causation test under the
false statement doctrine and eventually win their cases.
The plain meaning of the causation test provisions does not answer
the question of whether Article 18(b) and 18(c) are connected by “and” or
81

See id. art. 18.
Id. art. 18(a).
83
Id. art. 18(b). The disclosure date is the earlier of the revelation date or the correction date,
referring to the first time when the falsehood of a company’s prior statement is disclosed to the public
under Article 18.
84
Id. art. 18(c).
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See id. art. 18.
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“or.” On the one hand, the connector between Article 18(b) and 18(c) seems
to be “and” by reading Articles 18 and 19 together. Article 19(a) explicitly
excludes a causal relationship when an investor sells the stock before the
disclosure date.86 If the connector between Article 18(b) and 18(c) is “or,”
an investor may prove the causation test when he buys the stock after the
false statement date and sells before the disclosure date under Article 18.
This is certainly inconsistent with Article 19.
On the other hand, a connector “or” is also possible if one examines
the structure and the coherent use of wording of the two articles. Article 18
imposes the burden of proof on the plaintiff to establish a causal
relationship.87 By contrast, Article 19 imposes the burden on the defendant
to provide evidence to rebut the plaintiff’s allegation.88 These two articles
are parallel to each other in the statutory structure. In addition, both Article
18 and Article 19 employ the exact same wording before their respective
illustration of circumstances that a people’s court shall (Article 19 here
includes “not”) find a causal relationship “under any of the following
circumstances”.89 The text seems clear enough that no causal relationship
exists under Article 19 whenever one of the Article 19 circumstances is
proven.90 This strongly indicates that a causal relationship can be shown by
any of “the following circumstances” of Article 18(b) and 18(c).91
However, an investor’s reasonable reactions to different false
statements support the use of the connector “or” between Article 18(b) and
18(c). In an article explaining the false statement doctrine, one of the SPC
Judges points out that the causation test in the SPC Provisions is drafted
according to the different effects of two types of false statements on
investors’ transactional behavior.92 A false statement can be either falsely
optimistic or falsely pessimistic information about a listed company.93 For
example, suppose a listed company falsely announces a revenue increase.
The company’s stock price increases accordingly and investors purchase the
86

Id. art. 19(a).
See id. art. 18; Jia Wei, supra note 78, at 10.
88
SPC Provision, supra note 17, art. 19; Guo Feng, Zheng quan shi chang xu jia chen shu ji qi min
shi pei chang ze ren [False Statements in Securities Market and Its Civil Liability], ZHONGGUO MINSHANG
FALV WANG [CHINESE CIVIL LAW NETWORK], available at http://www.civillaw.com.cn/weizhang/
default.asp?id=15810 (last visited Apr. 16, 2006).
89
SPC Provision, supra note 17, arts. 18, 19.
90
See id. art. 19.
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Id. art. 18(b), (c).
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Arising from False Statement in Securities Market”], RENMIN FAYUAN BAO [NEWSPAPER OF PEOPLE’S
COURT], Jan. 22, 2003.
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listed company’s stock relying on the false revenue increase news. The
stock price decreases and the investors suffer losses on or after the date
when the company’s false statement is disclosed, and the company has not
performed well enough to increase its revenues. Presumably, the stock price
will not be negatively affected by the false statement before its disclosure.
Thus, the causal relationship can only be found when an investor sells or
holds the stock after the revelation or correction date.94
Similarly, a false statement that reports untruthfully pessimistic
information about the company can also cause the investors’ loss.95 Even
though most companies are inclined to make falsely optimistic statements,
the opposite scenario also exists.96 Many scholars have criticized the
causation test in the SPC Provisions as insufficiently conceptualizing the
pessimistic false statement scenario.97 Investors who suffer losses from the
false bad information should be equally protected.98 Sitting in equity, a court
should find the causal relationship in cases where investors sell the stock
before the disclosure date as well as those who hold the stock all along or
sell afterwards, so long as the investors can prove actual losses.99
The absence of a connector between Article 18(b) and 18(c) results in
different readings as to what kind of investors might bring sufficient
evidence to prove the existence of a causal relationship. Once a court
determines the revelation date or the correction date, it can find a causal
relationship if the investor buys the stock before the disclosure of a
94

Jia Wei, supra note 78, at 10.
For example, a company that has received favorable tax treatment does not disclose the good news
to the public in a timely manner. In this scenario, the stock price will be lower than it should be if not for
the false statement. The investor sells the stock before the disclosure of the false statement. The stock
price increases when the false bad information is disclosed and corrected. The investor has given up the
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supra note 92.
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See Chen Jianjun, Wo guo zheng quan shi chang xu jia chen shu min shi pei chang shi du ping xi
[Comments on the System of Civil Reparations Resulting from False Statements in Chinese Stock Market],
7 YANGZHOU ZHIYE DAXUE XUEBAO [J. YANGZHOU POLYTECHNIC C.] 15, 17 (2003).
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XUEBAO [J. HAR’ERBIN U. COMMERCE] 102, 103-4 (2004); Wei Shufa & Jiang Qinhui, Zheng quan shi
chang xu jia chen shu min shi ze ren tan tao [A Tentative Study of Civil Liability for False Statements in
Securities Market], 5 FUJIAN LUNTAN: RENWEN SHEHUI KEXUE BAN [FUJIAN FORUM: SOCIAL SCIENCE]
126, 126 (2005).
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supra note 18; Han Jin & Zhao Yongping, supra note 97; Wei Shufa & Jiang Qinhui, supra note 97.
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company’s falsification of information and sells or holds afterwards.100 By
contrast, if an investor buys and sells after the disclosure date, the
company’s false statement cannot cause the investor’s loss.101 However,
pursuant to the principles of equity, a court may interpret the causation test
provisions broadly to provide remedies to investors who sell the stock before
the disclosure date.
B.

The Revelation Date and Correction Date Are Ambiguous and Offer
Courts Wide Discretion in Interpretation

The revelation date and the correction date are not clearly defined in
the SPC Provisions. Under Article 20, the revelation date is the day when
the false statement is disclosed for the first time in the nationwide media.102
However, the Article does not designate the authority of disclosure to any
specific media entities.103 Few people will question the authority of a CSRC
announcement, or one from Securities Daily, the single largest securities
newspaper in China. However, it is up to the courts to decide whether many
other disclosing entities are qualified authorities under Article 20 to reveal
false statements to the public.
Article 20 also fails to specify the degree to which existing
misinformation should be revealed to the public so as to constitute sufficient
disclosure.104 After a listed company has made any false statement, many
kinds of suspicions of its misconducts are likely to arise in the market before
the full authoritative disclosure of the misinformation.105 Mere suspicion of
misinformation probably does not suffice as public disclosure under Article
20. However, most investors will hastily sell the stock upon any suspicious
news of the company’s misconducts.106
The definition of correction date in Article 20 is also ambiguous. The
correction date occurs when the listed company announces and corrects the
false statement on CSRC-designated media and suspends trading in its
shares in accordance with provided procedures.107 The definition does not
specify what kind of correction by the listed company qualifies as
“announcement and correction” under the SPC Provisions.108 It is unclear
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108

See SPC Provisions, supra note 17, art. 18.
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Id. art. 20.
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Wei Shufa & Jiang Qinhui, supra note 97, at 126.
Chen Jie, supra note 18, at 39.
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SPC Provisions, supra note 17, art. 20.
See id.
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whether a company’s mere mentioning of prior misrepresentation or
omission in one or two short sentences is sufficient. The SPC Provisions are
also unclear as to the required “procedures” that a company should go
through to suspend trading.109
A court’s determination of the revelation date and the correction date
is essential to the causation test. The general rule of the causation test under
Article 18 reflects a timing structure.110 The finding of causation entirely
depends on when the purchase and sale transactions of purchase and sale
take place with the respect to the revelation date or the correction date.111
When the statutory definitions are uncertain, a court understandably has
more discretion to reach its legal conclusion.112
C.

The Scope and Effect of Systemic Risks Under Article 19 Are Subject
to Each Court’s Interpretation

The concept of so-called systemic risks in the SPC Provisions is not
only ambiguous but also highly adverse to individual investors. Article
19(d) excludes the existence of a causal relationship if a defendant company
proves that the investor’s loss or part of the investor’s loss results from the
systemic risks of the securities market.113 The SPC Provisions do not define
the concept of systemic risks. The idea of systemic risks with respect to the
stock market seems to presume that stock transactions are intrinsically risky
and investors have to absorb all the consequences resulting from such
systemic risks.114 This implicitly invites questions, such as what kind of
evidence a defendant may introduce to prove the systemic risks, the extent of
the burden of proof, and how a plaintiff may rebut the defendant’s allegation
of “systemic risks.” All of these questions are left unanswered in the SPC
Provisions.115
To deny causation with proof of systemic risks is potentially
disadvantageous to investors because a defendant may exaggerate the effect
of systemic risks to dodge its liability. A defendant will certainly raise the
argument of systemic risks to deny the existence of causation, since systemic
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risks always exist in the stock market.116 Due to ambiguity in the scope and
effect of systemic risks, a false statement case becomes highly
unpredictable. A plaintiff may never survive the causation test because the
systemic risks are presumably an intrinsic part of any stock transaction and
always related to investment losses to some degree.117 The uncertainty of
the systemic-risk argument will deter investors from bringing cases against
companies who have breached their duty of disclosure. A court should be
particularly cautious in evaluating systemic-risk arguments to prevent
companies’ abuse of this argument as allowed for under Article 19.
As a result, a court may exercise its judicial discretion in its
application of the causation test due to the confusion of the SPC Provisions.
Articles 18, 19 and 20 of the causation test contain unresolved issues that are
open to the court’s interpretation. The interpretation of the causation test,
narrowly or broadly, will directly affect the conflicting interests of public
investors and listed companies. Filling in the gaps of the SPC Provisions, a
court must take an explicit and firm position in carrying out its judicial role
in the causation test.
IV.

TWO SECURITIES CASES DEMONSTRATE JUDICIAL UNCERTAINTY IN THE
APPLICATION OF THE CAUSATION TEST

After the SPC’s promulgation of its judicial interpretation of the false
statement doctrine in civil securities cases, the courts have started to apply
the SPC Provisions to pending or new securities cases brought by public
investors seeking compensation for their investment losses resulting from
the listed companies’ false statements. Whether a listed company’s false
statement is the cause of an investor’s loss becomes the key issue in many
cases.118 Among these cases, the Jinan Intermediate People’s Court decided
that a plaintiff investor failed to prove causation in Zhang He v. Bohai
Group,119 while the Ha’erbin Intermediate People’s Court found the
existence of causation between the false statement and investors’ losses in
116
Zhen quan min shi su song yue zou yue zhai [A Narrower Road toward Private Securities
Litigation], ZHENGQUAN SHIBAO [SECURITIES TIMES], Aug. 5, 2004, available at
http://news1.jrj.com.cn/news/2004-08-05/000000871456.html.
117
See id.
118
See Zhou Fenmian, Xu jia chen shu si fa jie shi chun liang da que xian [The Judicial
Interpretation of False Statement Doctrine Contains Two Major Defects], FAZHI WANG [LEGAL
NETWORK], available at http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/misc/2006-04/19/content_302505.htm (last visited
Apr. 20, 2006); see also Cai Feng, Jia bao an quan bu jie an shi jian zhong bao lu bu fen si fa lou dong
[Some Judicial Problems Were Shown upon the Completion of Jiaobao Case], available at
http://finance.sina.com.cn/t/20030128/0743307081.shtml (last visited Apr. 20, 2006).
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Chen Lihua v. Daqing Lianyi Corporation.120 Both courts focused on the
definition of the disclosure date and the effect of systemic risks in the
causation test of the false statement doctrine.121 Nevertheless, the two courts
reached different conclusions in the causation test, which ultimately
determined the result between the investors and the companies.
A.

The Court in Zhang He v. Bohai Group Found No Causal
Relationship

The facts of this case indicate a relatively straightforward incidence of
a false statement. In 1993, Bohai Group acquired Jinan Matches Factory.122
In its acquisition and merger report as part of its “Public Announcement,”
Bohai Group announced that a bank offered it favorable interest rate loans
for the acquisition.123 However, Bohai Group did not disclose the fact that it
would not be able to enjoy the low interest benefit until the banks reported to
their supervisory bank and received final approval.124 Instead, Bohai Group
became a defendant in a lawsuit filed by one bank for the interest
payment.125 From 1994 to 1998, Bohai Group never counted its interest
expenses for acquisition loans in its annual financial statements.126 In 1999,
Bohai Group added its interest expenses from 1994 to 1998 in its 1999
interim financial statements.127
From March 2000 to November 2001, the CSRC conducted a series of
investigations into potential false statements by listed companies.128 The
CSRC found that Bohai Group, among sixteen other listed companies, made
false statements in violation of the Securities Law.129 The CSRC further
publicized Bohai Group’s false statement in its Letter of Administrative
120
Daqing Lianyi, supra note 6. The case report publicized by the Higher People’s Court of
Heilongjiang also includes the text of the case report issued by the Ha’erbin Intermediate People’s Court
(the trial court). The discussions of both the trial court decision and appellate court’s opinion are based on
this case report.
121
See infra Part IV.A-B.
122
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company/sh/600858/24/43.shtml (last visited Apr. 18, 2006) (summarizing the CSRC’s Letter of
Administrative Penalty to Bohai Group on Dec. 3, 2001).
123
Id. According to the announced favorable interest loan, Bohai Group would be waived the interest
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YOUTH], Aug. 4, 2004, available at http://finance.news.tom.com/1008/1009/200484-80375.html.
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Penalty on November 5, 2001.130 Every listed company whose false
statement had been investigated and discovered by the CSRC received such
a penalty letter, which constituted a confirmation of the listed company’s
wrongdoing and the administrative prerequisite to file a civil lawsuit by a
public investor against the listed company.131
Plaintiff Zhang He was a clerk working at a bank’s branch office in
Zaozhuang, Shandong.132 On August 16 and 17, 2001, he purchased a total
of 1500 shares of the defendant company’s stocks at the price of RMB
18,435 (US$2,304).133 The stock price decreased continuously after his
purchase.134 On January 29, 2002, after the publication of the Letter of
Administrative Penalty to the defendant in November 2001, Zhang sold the
stock at the loss of RMB 9,434 (US$1,179).135 Zhang filed the lawsuit in
February 2002 asking for RMB 9,930 (US$1,241) in damages, which
included the loss from the stock transaction and other related costs.136
The Jinan Intermediate People’s Court decided for the defendant on
the ground that a causal relationship did not exist between the defendant
company’s false statement and Zhang’s loss in his stock trading.137 The
Court found no causal relationship established in the case for two reasons.
First, Bohai Group corrected its prior false financial information in 1999
while Zhang purchased the stock in 2001.138 Thus the trial court concluded
that Zhang could not have relied on the defendant’s false statement when he
traded the stock and that his stock transaction was not causally related to the
defendant’s false statement.139 Second, Bohai Group successfully proved
that Zhang’s loss resulted from the systemic risks in the stock market rather
than from his reliance on the company’s false statement.140 The Court
reasoned that stock transactions were full of risk and that public investors
had to consider and bear the risk resulting from fluctuations in the market.141
130
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The Court found that the defendant sustained its burden of proof by
demonstrating the decreasing Composite Index of the whole stock market
during the period of time when Zhang was conducting his transaction.142
The Jinan Intermediate People’s Court’s reasoning in support of its
decision raises serious concerns about the likelihood that a plaintiff will
survive the causation test in a false statement case. The court’s finding of
the disclosure of the false statement in 1999 is questionable. According to
the court, Bohai made false statements in 1994 and corrected the
misinformation in its financial statements in 1999.143 Zhang purchased the
stock in August 2001.144 In November 2001, the CSRC announced its Letter
of Administrative Penalty to Bohai Group.145 Zhang sold his stock at a loss
in January 2002.146 If Bohai Group had corrected its false statement in 1999,
Zhang’s trading after the disclosure of Bohai Group’s misconduct could not
have caused his loss. If Bohai Group’s false statement was not disclosed
until the CSRC’s issuance of the penalty report in November 2001, Zhang’s
purchase in August 2001 and sale in January 2002 would meet the most
rigorous causation test under Article 18. In that scenario, Zhang obviously
bought before the disclosure date and sold afterwards.
While the CSRC’s penalty letter would undoubtedly be considered
authoritative national disclosure of the defendant’s misconduct under Article
20, it is arguable whether Bohai Group’s 1999 financial statements qualify
as a “correction” under the SPC Provisions. In its 1999 Interim Report,
Bohai Group merely mentioned that it had settled with the bank with regard
to the interest payment and would pay all the interests from 1994 to 1999
that it owed to the bank.147 Bohai Group did not explicitly and affirmatively
confess the fact that it did not disclose the interest expenses in its financial
statements from 1994 to 1998.148 It was very unlikely that a reasonable
investor would consider this a sufficient disclosure of Bohai’s prior
misinformation. The facts on record do not sufficiently support the court’s
finding that Bohai Group had corrected its false statement in 1999.
In addition, the court overemphasized the effect of systemic risks in
this case. At trial, Bohai presented the Composite Index of Shanghai Stock
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Exchange.149 During the period of time when Zhang traded the stock, the
Composite Index of the stock market went down continuously.150 In reliance
on the gloominess of the market as a whole, the court concluded that
systemic risks, rather than Bohai’s false statement, was the real cause of
Zhang’s loss.151 This conclusion entirely ignored the individual performance
of a company’s stock in the stock market. The stock market is not only risky
but also dynamic. The performance of the stock market as a whole will
certainly exert some influence on the price of one stock.152 Nevertheless the
gloominess of the stock market never precludes the possibility of price
increases of individual stocks.153 The decrease of a stock’s price can be
attributable to multiple causes.154 The court’s attribution of the cause solely
to systemic risks is neither persuasive nor equitable to public investors.
The Jinan Intermediate People’s Court’s denial of the causal
relationship in Zhang’s case reflects not only the confusion in the causation
test of SPC Provisions but also the insurmountable obstacle that an investor
will encounter in a false statement case. The court’s finding of a correction
date lacks sufficient factual support. Its overemphasis of systemic risks
opens the door to potential abuse in counter-proving the causation between
the defendant’s misconduct and the plaintiff’s loss in false statement cases.
Based on the court’s reasoning, a defendant can easily rebut a plaintiff’s
allegation on the ground of systemic risks and shake off the liability. Many
lawyers and public investors have expressed their dissatisfaction with the
trial court’s reasoning,155 because the trial court did not perform its judicial
role properly and failed to protect the interests of the individual investor in
this false statement case.156
B.

Public Investors Won a Compromised Victory in Chen Lihua v. Daqing
Lianyi, Inc. Due to the Court’s Finding of Disclosure Dates

The facts of the Daqing Lianyi case are more complicated than that of
Bohai Group. The plaintiffs were twenty-three individual investors who had

149
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been involved in Defendant Daqing Lianyi Corporation (“Daqing Lianyi”)
stock transactions.157
Daqing was incorporated in Heilongjiang Province. Lianyi Shihua
Factory (“Lianyi”) was Daqing’s predecessor.158 On April 26, 1997, Lianyi
published a Prospectus on behalf of Daqing Lianyi.159 The Prospectus had
included untruthful revenue information so as to attract public capital.160
Daqing Lianyi issued its IPO on the Shanghai Stock Exchange in May
1997.161 On March 23, 1998, Daqing Lianyi again untruthfully reported a
revenue increase in the “1997 Annual Report.”162 The misconduct of Daqing
Lianyi, and of its predecessor Lianyi, caused the attention of some
governmental supervisory agencies.163 At the request of a supervisory
agency, the Board of Daqing Lianyi published a “Board Announcement” in
Securities Daily on April 21, 1999, admitting that Daqing Lianyi was under
investigation for falsifying revenue increases in its 1997 Annual Report.164
On April 27, 2000, the CSRC issued its Letter of Administrative Penalty to
Daqing Lianyi and determined that Daqing Lianyi committed fraud in its
IPO and its 1997 Annual Report.165
The twenty-three plaintiffs brought suit against Daqing Lianyi at
Ha’erbin Intermediate People’s Court after the issuance of the CSRC Letter
of Administrative Penalty to Daqing Lianyi.166 The plaintiffs had started
trading Daqing Lianyi stock in May 1997 and sold or held the stock around
April 27, 2000.167 The plaintiffs sought RMB 960,063 (US$120,007) in
damages under the false statement doctrine.168
Daqing Lianyi, as a defense, argued that no causal relationship existed
between the plaintiffs’ loss and any false statement made by Daqing Lianyi
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or its predecessor Lianyi.169 Daqing Lianyi did not deny its misconduct in
making false statements, nor did it question whether the plaintiffs actually
suffered loss. Rather, Daqing Lianyi tried to deny the existence of a causal
relationship under the false statement doctrine.170 At trial, Daqing Lianyi
argued that the revelation date was not April 21, 1999, but rather April 27,
2000 when the CSRC issued its Letter of Administrative Penalty.171 Daqing
Lianyi believed that its Board Announcement on April 21, 1999 about the
investigation of its alleged false statement was merely a warning to the
public of potential transaction risks.172 In addition, Daqing Lianyi claimed
that the systemic risks in the stock market were the real cause of the
plaintiffs’ loss.173
The trial court decided for the plaintiffs on the issue of causation and
the appellate court affirmed. The appellate court found that April 21, 1999
was the correction date of the false statement in Daqing Lianyi’s 1997
Annual Report when its board announced the ongoing investigation. The
court found that April 27, 2000 was the revelation date of Daqing Lianyi’s
false statement in its 1997 Prospectus when the CSRC issued its Letter of
Administrative Penalty.174 In addition, the appellate court found that Daqing
failed to prove that systemic risks were the cause of the plaintiffs’ loss.175
The court awarded the plaintiffs their actual loss of RMB 425,388
(US$53,173).176 The award was about half of the plaintiffs’ claimed
damages because the court’s loss calculation was based on its finding of the
revelation date and the correction date.177
The trial court made a substantial effort to support its finding of
causation. However, the court’s finding concerning disclosure dates is still
problematic. Daqing Lianyi fabricated its revenue information in its
Prospectus in April 1997 and made similar false statements in its Annual
Report in 1998.178 In 1999, the Board of Daqing Lianyi announced that it
was under investigation for allegedly making false statements.179 In April
2000, the CSRC issued its Letter of Administrative Penalty, confirming
Daqing Lianyi’s fraud in its IPO and misrepresentation in its Annual Report
169
170
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in 1998.180 All the plaintiffs started trading Daqing Lianyi stock in May
1997 and continued until April 2000, when the CSRC official announced
Daqing Lianyi’s misconduct.181 Daqing Lianyi attempted to persuade the
court that its false statement was not disclosed until 2000 when the CSRC
confirmed Daqing Lianyi’s fraud and misrepresentation.182
The most rigorous causation test requires, under Article 18, that the
investor sell after the disclosure date.183 Many plaintiffs sold the stock
before April 2000.184 If the court adopted Daqing Lianyi’s argument, the
plaintiffs’ sale of the stock before April 2000 would negate the causation
between Daqing Lianyi’s misinformation and most plaintiffs’ losses. By
contrast, the plaintiffs tried to prove that the Board’s announcement of the
investigation determined the disclosure date in 1999.185 If the court adopted
the plaintiffs’ argument, all the stock sales after 1999 and before 2000 would
satisfy the causation test. Because the Board Announcement date occurred
one year earlier than the Letter of Administrative Penalty date, the court’s
adoption of either party’s argument would result in significant differences in
loss calculation.
Instead of choosing between the two arguments, the court reached its
own conclusion regarding the disclosure dates. Affirming the trial court’s
decision, the appellate court found that the Board Announcement in 1999
disclosed Daqing Lianyi’s misrepresentation in its Annual Report while the
Letter of Administrative Penalty in 2000 disclosed Daqing Lianyi’s fraud in
its Prospectus.186 Although the CSRC’s report was an official announcement
of both Daqing Lianyi’s IPO fraud and later misrepresentation, it was
difficult to tell whether the announcement of investigation revealed all false
statements or merely Daqing Lianyi’s misrepresentation in its Annual
Report.187 The court’s decision concerning the disclosure dates was a
compromise between the two parties’ contentions, with neither party
winning completely. Based on this compromise, the court awarded the
plaintiffs half of their claimed damages in its loss calculation.188
Both the trial court and the appellate court found in favor of the
plaintiffs regarding Daqing Lianyi’s systemic risks argument.189 The
180
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appellate court admitted that the causation test did not define the meaning of
“systemic risks.”190 According to its own understanding, the appellate court
concluded that systemic risks were “risks affecting the prices of all stocks in
the market” and beyond the control of individual companies.191
The court further identified two steps that a defendant company
should take to sufficiently rebut the causation. First, the defendant must
present the specific facts that constitute so-called systemic risks.192 Second,
the defendant must prove that such specific facts have caused the price
fluctuation in the whole stock market.193 The court made it clear that a
decrease in the Composite Index of the stock market as a whole was not
sufficient evidence to prove the effect of systemic risks.194
This case represents a victory for investors in false statement cases in
which the causation test is applied. The plaintiffs did not receive all the
claimed damages because of the court’s compromise in the determination of
disclosure dates. Nevertheless, through its own interpretation of systemic
risks, the court successfully mitigated the overwhelming adverse effect that
the systemic-risks argument could impose on investors’ cases. Though the
plaintiffs did not win completely, they created an example of how investors
may rebut the argument of systemic risks in the causation test in civil
securities cases.
V.

THE JUDICIARY SHOULD PLAY A PROTECTIVE ROLE TOWARD PUBLIC
INVESTORS IN ITS APPLICATION OF THE CAUSATION TEST IN CIVIL
SECURITIES LITIGATION

In the interests of bolstering investor confidence, courts should
interpret the causation test in favor of public investors in close false
statement cases where public investors seek civil compensation against listed
companies for fraud, misrepresentation or major omission of material
information. As discussed above, proof of causation is often crucial in
contests between public investors and listed companies.195 Bound by the
SPC Provisions, courts must apply the most rigorous causation test based on
the rigid timing structure of Article 18.196 Many investors whose losses are
attributable to defendant companies’ false statements might be excluded
190
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from receiving compensation. However, with limited discretion, a court
should protect public investors’ interests with the causation test. Both
current government policy and the success of China’s economic reform
require substantial judicial protection of the interests of public investors in
civil securities litigation. In addition, due to the confusion surrounding the
causation test in the SPC Provisions, an explicit position of a court in favor
of public investors in close cases not only saves transaction costs but also
enhances judicial certainty and consistency.
A.

Courts Should Evaluate the Totality of the Circumstances in
Determining the Revelation and Correction Dates

To find the right revelation or correction date, a simple review of facts
relating to when the false statement was revealed or corrected is insufficient.
Due to the timing structure of the causation test, the determination of the
date will either prove the causation or completely deprive a plaintiff of
compensation.197 Each party tries to persuade the court to pick the date in its
favor. When investors file a lawsuit employing the false statement doctrine,
they usually have already stopped trading the alleged stock. The timing of
their trading is decisive at trial. By contrast, the defendant company is likely
to have a choice between the CSRC’s announcement and its own corporate
activities which may indicate the defendant’s prior false statement. For
example, in Bohai Group, the defendant company managed to persuade the
court that the defendant’s own adjustment in financial statements amounted
to a “correction” or “revelation” under Article 20.198 In Daqing Lianyi, the
defendant company argued that the Board announcement was merely a
warning and did not constitute a “revelation.”199 The company contended
that the CSRC’s announcement was the official “revelation” of the
company’s false statement to the public.200
Instead of a factual review to decide the timing of the revelation or
correction, a court should examine the unveiling effect of the alleged
“revelation” or “correction.” The timing structure of the causation test
presumes the causal effect the disclosure of a false statement will exert on
investors’ transactions and losses.201 According to this presumption, the
false statement will not affect the stock price before or long after its
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disclosure, but will cause a price change upon its disclosure.202 Therefore, a
court should question whether the alleged “revelation” or “correction” has
brought about such disclosure.
A court must evaluate all relevant factors in finding the revelation or
correction date with respect to the disclosing party, the means of disclosure,
and the extent of disclosure. The CSRC’s issuance of a Letter of
Administrative Penalty for a listed company’s false statement is an
unquestionable “revelation” under Article 20.203 In most cases, whether the
alleged corporate activity amounts to sufficient disclosure is the issue before
the court, but no single factor is dispositive. A court must examine the
totality of the circumstances and consider the effect of the alleged corporate
activity from the perspective of a reasonable investor.
B.

Courts Must Firmly Prevent the Abuse of the Systemic Risks Argument

A court should be skeptical when presented with the systemic risks
argument. Under Article 19, the proof of systemic risks constitutes a
sufficient rebuttal to causation between the alleged false statement and the
plaintiff’s loss.204 If a defendant succeeds in the systemic risks argument,
the plaintiff loses both the contest over the causation test and the entire
lawsuit. Despite the significance of the systemic risks argument,205 the SPC
Provisions neither define the meaning of systemic risks nor specify the
burden of proof. This presents certain unintended problems. Due to the
uncertain yet destructive effect of the systemic risks argument with respect
to causation, every defendant may invariably claim that the investment loss
is a result of systemic risks. In both Bohai Group and Daqing Lianyi, the
defendant companies spared no effort in persuading the courts to adopt this
argument, though the outcomes differed.206 The potential abuse of the
systemic risks argument imposes additional obstacles to the plaintiffs’ case
beyond the rigorous timing structure of the causation test. A court must
cautiously deal with the systemic risks argument and try to undermine its
overreaching destructive consequence in a false statement case.
The judiciary should send a clear message to the community of its
opinion about the systemic risks argument. The SPC Provisions leave the
rule of systemic risks open to the courts. On the issue of systemic risks, a
court should not reach a conclusion, especially in favor of a defendant
202
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company, without a thorough interpretation of the rule. The court must solve
two problems in its interpretation of systemic-risks: (1) identifying the
systemic risks and (2) deciding what burden of proof a defendant should
bear. In Daqing Lianyi, the appellate court adopted a two-step test.207 The
court required that a defendant arguing systemic risks as the cause of the
plaintiff’s loss demonstrate the specific facts of systemic risks.208 In
addition, the defendant would be required to prove that those specific facts
caused the price change in the stock market.209 A court of another province
does not have to adopt the same two-step test. Yet every court in its own
interpretation of the rule should ensure the requirement of specific
arguments and a relatively high burden of proof. Otherwise, few plaintiffs
who have in fact suffered losses from the listed company’s false statement
may prevail in the causation test.
C.

Current Government Policy, Revitalization of the Stock Market, and
Judicial Consistency Justify Judicial Protection of Investors’ Interests

A considerable disparity in the power between public investors and
listed companies calls for judicial protection of public investors’ interests.
Most Chinese investors, referred to as “scattered households” (san hu),210 are
individual investors. Each san hu is one of “thousands of passive actors” in
the stock market and barely has any control over or impact on other
participants like the listed companies.211 Public investors face many more
disadvantages than listed companies. Most investors are middle class
workers and the average share ownership of each investor is very limited.212
Few investors possess the necessary basic knowledge about stock investment
and they are often subject to fraud at the hands of stock issuers.213 In
addition, local governments tend to favor the interests of local companies
listed in the stock market and often help cover up fraud.214 As a result,
public investors are usually unable to fight against the oppressive behavior
207
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of the more powerful participants in the stock market, such as the listed
companies’ fraud or misleading disclosure.215 To redress that imbalance for
public investors, the judiciary should perform its role in terms of fairness
and equity in private securities litigation.216
Protection of public investors is one of the top agendas of current
Chinese government policy. Many listed companies were transformed from
state-owned enterprises.217 One of the primary purposes in establishing a
stock market in China was to raise sufficient capital for state-owned
enterprises from the public.218 Many listed companies manipulated the stock
market “as a channel to pool investors’ money.”219 Overall, investors’
interests were not in contemplation of the initial design of the stock market
and corresponding legal mechanism. The tone then changed in 2000, with
investor protection becoming a major concern in recent years.220
In 2004, the State Council issued the Opinions on Promoting the
Reform, Opening and Steady Growth of Capital Markets.221 In its opinion,
the State Council repeatedly called for the protection of public investors’
rights and interests.222 This policy declaration signified the central
government’s determination to protect public investors.223 Furthermore,
protection of public investors’ interests was one of the primary reasons for
the revision of China’s Securities Law.224 Ensuring public investors’ rights
and interests was the top priority of CSRC, for which it earnestly lobbied
law-makers.225 In judicial practice, judges should interpret and apply the
rules of law in private securities litigation in a way that echoes this policy.
The revitalization of the Chinese stock market requires forceful
judicial protection of public investors’ interests. Due to the inadequacy of
legal protection, listed companies are more interested in raising money but
have less incentive to improve their performance.226
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promulgation of SPC Provisions, numerous investors who had suffered
losses in reliance on fabricated information could not receive any remedy
from wrongdoers. Consequently, investors’ confidence diminished and the
stock market deteriorated.227 A protective judicial role toward public
investors is necessary to redress the listed companies’ past wrongdoings and
to deter them from violating the law in the future. A private securities case
can involve a large number of plaintiffs.228 Companies are more likely to
comply with their duty of disclosure under the threat of massive liability.229
In addition, the assurance of legal protection and remedy helps to revitalize
investor confidence and attract more funds from the public.230 As scholars
suggest, a realistic remedy for infringed investors, offered by a legal
decision-maker such as a judge in a private securities case, is probably the
only assurance of social stability and harmony in the development of China’s
capital markets.231
A uniform judicial attitude to protect public investors enhances
judicial certainty and consistency in private securities litigation. Most
plaintiffs in private securities litigation are individual investors.232 Both
their investment and potential for loss are very limited. The uncertainty in
judicial practice raises their costs, considering the time and expense of a
lawsuit. In contrast with general tort lawsuits, a private securities lawsuit
may be filed by numerous plaintiffs against the same defendants for the
same cause in different courts.233 It is very likely that different courts may
conclude differently for cases arising from the same cause.234 For example,
though the parties were different in Bohai Group and Daqing Lianyi, one
court ruled against the defendant’s systemic-risks argument while the other
court agreed with the defendant, yet the defendants in the two cases
presented similar evidence and adopted the same reasoning in the same
rebuttal against causation of the false statement doctrine.235
The
inconsistency between the lower courts will “jeopardize the reputation and
credibility of the legal system.”236 Where class action lawsuits are not yet
permitted in private securities litigation in China, the best solution is for
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lower courts to adopt a uniform and explicit judicial position in favor of
public investors in a contested false statement case.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Private securities litigation is a necessary legal mechanism to deter
listed companies from misconduct and to protect the interests of public
investors.237 However, the earlier securities laws in China failed to provide
such a legal mechanism and public investors had no sufficient cause of
action against violators for stock trading losses as a result of listed
companies’ false statements. The SPC formally established the false
statement doctrine in private securities litigation through its judicial
interpretation. Nevertheless, public investors are still facing challenges to
win their cases and gain monetary compensation due to the confusion
contained in the causation test of the SPC Provisions. Two cases
demonstrate that different interpretations of the causation test by the lower
courts can eventually determine the outcome of a private securities dispute.
Lower courts hearing private securities cases should play a protective
role toward public investors in their application of the causation test.
Protection of public investors’ interests reflects current Chinese government
policy. In addition, it is also vital to reconstruct the confidence of public
investors in the stock market. The judiciary must perform its adjudicatory
role to punish the wrongdoers and compensate the victims so as to assure the
stability of the capital market in China.
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